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Abstract
The relationship between in‡ation and in‡ation uncertainty is investigated in
six European Union countries for the period 1960 to 1999. EGARCH models are
used to generate a measure of in‡ation uncertainty and then Granger methods are
employed to test for causality between averagein‡ation and in‡ation uncertainty. In
all the European countries, except Germany, in‡ation signi…cantly raises in‡ation
uncertainty as predicted by Friedman. However, in all countries except the UK,
in‡ation uncertainty doesnot causenegativeoutput e¤ects, implying that acommon
European monetary policy applied by the ECB might not lead to asymmetric real
e¤ectsvia thein‡ation uncertainty channel. Lessrobust evidenceisfound regarding
the direction of the impact of a change in in‡ation uncertainty on in‡ation. In
Germany and theNetherlands, increased in‡ation uncertainty lowersin‡ation, while
in Italy, Spain, and to a lesser extent France, increased in‡ation uncertainty raises
in‡ation. Theseresultsaregenerally consistent with theexistingrankingsofCentral
Bank Independence.
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11 INTRODUCTION
The importance of in‡ation uncertainty as a distinct channel in explaining the real e¤ects
of in‡ation has recently been given considerable empirical support (Grier and Tullock,
1989, Grier and Perry, 2000, Judson and Orphanides, 2000). This channel was …rst high-
lighted in Friedman’s (1977) Nobel lecture. Friedman supplied an informal argument that
an increase in the average in‡ation rate would lead to more in‡ation uncertainty, thus
creating distortions in the workings of the price mechanism in allocating resources e¢-
ciently. Subsequent theoretical research focused on the opposite type of causation, which
runs from in‡ation uncertainty to in‡ation. For example, Cukierman and Meltzer (1986)
employ the Barro-Gordon set up and show that an increase in uncertainty about money
growthand in‡ation will increase the optimal average in‡ation rate because it provides an
incentive to the policymaker to create an in‡ation surprise in order to stimulate output
growth. Holland(1995) argues that more in‡ationuncertainty canlead to a lower average
in‡ation rate if the Central Bank tries to minimise the welfare losses arising from more
in‡ation uncertainty. In addition, the evidence on the direction of the e¤ect of in‡ation
uncertainty on in‡ation can be compared with the existing measures of Central Bank
Independence (Grier and Perry, 1998). These authors do …nd that the most independent
Central Banks are in countries where in‡ation declines as in‡ation uncertainty rises, thus
contradicting the Cukierman-Meltzer hypothesis.
The issue of the relationship between in‡ation, in‡ation uncertainty, and output
growth acquires great importance for the member countries of the Euro zone. First,
evidence that higher in‡ation causes more in‡ation uncertainty and, therefore, possible
negative output e¤ects would strengthen the case for the choice of price stability by the
European Central Bank (ECB) as one of the primary objectives of monetary policy. Sec-
ond, if the e¤ects of in‡ationon output that take place viachanges in in‡ationuncertainty
di¤er across the Euro zone, it is possible that a common monetary policy that results in
similar in‡ation rates across countries will have asymmetric real e¤ects. In other words,
a reduction inin‡ation arising from a contractionary monetary policy applied by the ECB
could reduce output in some countries but increase output in others, depending on the
combination of two e¤ects: (a) The Friedman hypothesis, i.e., the e¤ect of in‡ation on
in‡ation uncertainty and (b) the e¤ect of in‡ation uncertainty on output growth. There-
fore, lack of uniform evidence supporting the e¤ect of in‡ation on output via the in‡ation
uncertainty channel across the Euro-zone countries would have important policy implica-
tions as it would make a common monetary policy a less e¤ective stabilization policy tool
in dealing with national disparities.
Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (ARCH) and Generalized ARCH
(GARCH) techniques represent a commonly-used approach to proxy uncertainty using the
conditional variance of unpredictable shocks to the in‡ation rate1. These techniques have
recently been employed by Grier and Perry (1998) to investigate the direction of causality
in the in‡ation-in‡ation uncertainty relationship for the G72. Similarly, Grier and Perry
1Alternative measures of uncertainty include survey-based forecasts and a moving standard deviation
of in‡ation.
2We di¤er from this study in several respects: the GARCH model employed, the sample period,
the data frequency, the country group, and the consideration of output growth and its relationship with
2(2000) aim to examine the in‡ation-output uncertainty nexus in the US. The empirical
evidence to date on the Friedman and the Cukierman-Meltzer hypotheses provided by
Grier and Perry (1998) and a few other recent studies summarised below is rather mixed.
Grier and Perry (1998)3 use a GARCH model to estimate in‡ation uncertainty and run
Granger causality tests. We employ an exponential GARCH (EGARCH) model for two
reasons: First, we …nd evidence for asymmetries in the in‡ation uncertainty-in‡ation
relationship and, second, we follow Brunner and Hess (1993) in testing Friedman’s hy-
pothesis.
Our paper contributes to the empirical relationship between in‡ation and in‡ation
uncertainty in several ways: First, we use an EGARCH model instead of a GARCH
model, as discussed above. Second, we examine the relationship between in‡ation and
in‡ation uncertainty for several EU countries in order to examine whether a case could
be made against a common monetary policy, along the lines discussed above. Third, we
examine whether in‡ation is costly, a much-debated issue in monetary economics. Our
approach allows us to distinguish between the direct costs of in‡ation, and those that
arise via the in‡ation uncertainty channel, as predicted by Friedman (1977). The rest
of the paper is structured as follows: In section 2 our theoretical econometric model is
presented. In section 3 we summarise our empirical results. In section 4 we interpret these
results and relate them to the predictions of economic theory and other recent empirical
studies. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 THE EGARCH MODEL
2.1 THE AR(p)-EGARCH(1,1) PROCESS
One of the principal empirical tools used to model in‡ation uncertainty has been the
ARCH class of models. Following Engle’s (1982) pathbreaking idea, several formulations
of conditionally heteroscedastic models (e.g. GARCH, Fractional Integrated GARCH,
Switching GARCH, Component GARCH) have been introduced in the literature, form-
ing an immense ARCH family. However, as Brunner and Hess (1993, p. 187) argue,
”The GARCH model places a symmetric restriction on the conditional variance. Since
the variance is a function of squared residuals, agents become more uncertain about fu-
ture in‡ation whether in‡ation unexpectedly falls or unexpectedly rises. The essence
of Friedman’s hypothesis is inconsistent with such a symmetry restriction, since new in-
formation suggesting that in‡ation is lower should reduce, rather than raise, uncertainty
about future in‡ation”.
Many of the proposed GARCH models include a term that can capture correlation
between the in‡ation rate and in‡ation uncertainty. Models with this feature are often
termed asymmetric or leverage volatility models. One of the earliest asymmetric GARCH
models is the EGARCH model of Nelson (1991). In contrast to the conventional GARCH
speci…cation which requires nonnegative coe¢cients, the EGARCH model, by modeling
in‡ation uncertainty.
3The authors estimate both asymmetric and symmetric GARCH models. However, they cannot reject
the null hypothesis of symmetry. They, therefore, proceed to perform the Granger-causality tests using
the estimated conditional variance from the GARCH model of each country.
3the logarithm of the conditional variance, does not impose the nonnegativity constraints
on the parameter space. Of the many di¤erent functional forms, the EGARCH model
has become perhaps the most common. In particular, various cases of the EGARCH
model have been applied by many researchers. For example, Brunner and Hess (1993),
using EGARCH models, …nd that estimates of the conditional variance of U.S. in‡ation
are very similar to those obtained using state-dependent models.
We model the conditional mean of in‡ation as
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where yt denotes the rate of in‡ation. Equation (1) is simply an AR(p) process.
In addition, we model the time-varying residual variance as anEGARCH(1,1) process.
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where fetg is a sequence of independent, normally distributed random variables with
mean zero and variance 1. In the empirical work reported below, we estimate AR(p)-
EGARCH(1,1) models for in‡ation and then use the conditional variance ht as a measure
of in‡ation uncertainty.
3 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
3.1 METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
The relationship between in‡ation and in‡ationuncertainty could be estimated in asimul-
taneous approach as in a GARCH-in-mean (GARCH-M) model that includes a function
of the lagged in‡ation rate in the conditional variance equation or a two-step approach
where an estimate of the conditional variance is …rst obtained from a GARCH-type model
and then causality tests are run to test for bidirectional e¤ects. Examples of the former
approach include Brunner and Hess (1993), Grier and Perry (1998), Baillie et al (1996)
and Fountas et al (2000)4. The latter approach was followed in Grier and Perry (1998).
4Grier and Perry (1998) use a Component GARCH-M model of US in‡ation that includes lagged
in‡ation in the conditional variance, whereas Brunner and Hess (1993) use a state-dependent model
4The simultaneous approach su¤ers from the disadvantage that it does not allow the
testing of a lagged e¤ect of in‡ation uncertainty on in‡ation, which would be expected
in a study that employs monthly or quarterly data. As Grier and Perry (1998) mention,
the impact of a change in in‡ation uncertainty on average in‡ation, via a change in the
stabilization policy of the monetary authority, takes time to materialize and cannot be
fairly tested in a model that restricts the e¤ect to being contemporaneous.
3.2 The EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE TO DATE
The in‡ation-in‡ation uncertainty relationship has been analysed extensively in the em-
pirical literature. Holland (1993) and Davis and Kanago (2000) survey this literature.
In‡ation uncertainty is measured either using survey-based forecasts of in‡ation or the
GARCH approach. In the recent literature that employs the GARCH approach, the
U.S. evidence in favour of the Friedman hypothesis is mixed. Brunner and Hess (1993),
Grier and Perry (1998, 2000) and Fountas et al (2000) …nd evidence in favour, whereas
Baillie et al (1996) …nd evidence against it. The US evidence on the Cukierman-Meltzer
hypothesis is rather negative. Only Fountas et al (2000) …nd evidence in favour of the
hypothesis. There are a limited number of studies using international data that employ
the GARCH approach. They are Baillie et al (1996) and Grier and Perry (1998). Grier
and Perry (1998) …nd evidence supporting the Friedman hypothesis in the rest of the
G7 countries but Baillie et al (1996) …nd mixed evidence. Grier and Perry (1998) …nd
evidence supporting the Cukierman-Meltzer hypothesis in Japan and France and Baillie
et al (1996) in the UK and three high-in‡ation economies, Argentina, Brazil and Israel.
This study aims to …ll the gaps arising from the methodological shortcomings of the
previousstudies andthelack of interest in the Europeancase, where theresults wouldhave
interesting implications for the successful implementation of common European monetary
policy.
3.3 UK RESULTS
3.3.1 DESCRIPTION OF THE UK DATA AND ESTIMATION RESULTS
We …rst test for the relationship between in‡ation and in‡ation uncertainty using UK
data. Even though the UK is not presently a member of the Euro zone, it is likely that it
will participate in the European monetary union (EMU) in the future. In our empirical
application we use non-seasonally adjusted time series data on Consumer Price Index
obtained from the OECD Main Economic Indicators Database. Our sample includes
quarterly data from 1960:Q1 through 1999:Q2. Figure 1 plots the in‡ation rate (…t) series
constructed as the …rst di¤erence of the log of CPI. To establish that the in‡ation data
series is stationary we use both the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron
(PP) tests presented in Table 1(a) below. Using the second lagged di¤erence terms in
where the standard deviation of in‡ation is included in the mean equation and the lagged value of the
squared deviation of in‡ation from a parameter is included in the variance equation. Baillie et al (1996)
model in‡ation as a fractionally-integrated process and include lagged in‡ation in the conditional variance
equation and the standard deviation in the mean equation. Fountas et al (2000) use a GARCH-M model
that includes the lagged in‡ation rate in the variance equation.
5the ADF test and setting the truncation lag at four in the PP test, we …nd that both
tests reject the null hypothesis of a unit root at 0.01 signi…cance level. Hence, we have
evidence in this sample that the UK in‡ation rate is stationary. We choose an AR(6) plus
2 seasonal dummy variables5 model for the mean in‡ation rate and an EGARCH(1,1)
model for the variance equation, according to the minimum Akaike Information Criterion
(AIC) and Schwarz criterion (SC).
Table 1(b) presents the estimates of an AR(6)-EGARCH(1,1) model for the UK in‡a-
tion rate with two seasonal dummies. The model was estimated under quasi-maximum
likelihood estimation using the consistent variance-covariance estimator of Bollerslev and
Wooldridge (1992). Residual diagnostics for this model are also reported in Table 1(b),
and include Ljung-Box (Q) tests for residual correlation, and Ljung-Box diagnostics for
serial dependence in the squared residuals. As reported, the Ljung-Box tests for serial
correlation in the levels and squares of the standardized residuals do not reject the hy-
pothesis of no autocorrelation. Thus, the Ljung-Box tests indicate that the estimated
model …ts the data very well. The persistence of volatility implied by the EGARCH
equation is measured by the size of ﬂ, which is highly signi…cant. Asymmetry in in‡a-
tion uncertainty is conveniently quanti…ed by examining the sign of d. In the present
case, the positive and signi…cant value of the coe¢cient implies that periods of positive
in‡ation shocks are accompanied by high in‡ation uncertainty and periods of negative
in‡ation shocks are accompanied by lower uncertainty about in‡ation. In summary, the
AR(6)-EGARCH(1,1) model seems to …t both the mean and variance of the UK in‡ation
rate quite well.
3.3.2 GRANGER-CAUSALITY TESTS
Next we employ Granger methods to test for bidirectional causality between in‡ation
and in‡ation uncertainty. In particular, we test the null hypotheses that in‡ation does
not Granger-cause in‡ation uncertainty, and that in‡ation uncertainty does not Granger-
cause in‡ation using two, four, six, and eight lags6. The F statistics are reported in Table
2. These statistics have been obtained following correction for serial correlation and/or
heteroskedasticity in the unrestricted regression in each case. The …rst null hypothesis is
rejected at 0.01 level for all lags, while the second is also rejected at 0.10 or better. The
sum of the coe¢cients on lagged uncertainty in the in‡ation equation (at lags 2 and 6)
and on lagged in‡ation in the in‡ation uncertainty equation are positive. We thus provide
strong empirical con…rmation of Friedman’s hypothesis. We also …nd some evidence that
increased in‡ation uncertainty increases in‡ation, con…rming the theoretical predictions
made by Cukierman and Meltzer (1986).
In‡ation uncertainty has real e¤ects only if it leads to output losses. To test for such
e¤ects we have used the index of industrial production to construct the growth rate of
output. Our Granger-causality results in Table 2 (fourth column) indicate that higher
in‡ationuncertainty causes anegative output growthe¤ect, thus supporting the argument
5The seasonal dummy variables are included to seasonally adjust the in‡ation series. We …nd that 2
of these dummies are jointly statistically signi…cant.
6It is possible to test for the relationship between in‡ation and its uncertainty simultaneously, as
argued in Appendix A.
6that higher in‡ation uncertainty is part of the welfare costs of in‡ation7. Finally, in
the last column of Table 2, we report the F statistics on the causal e¤ect of in‡ation
uncertainty on output growth, where the regression includes in addition lagged in‡ation
rates. The rationale for this choice is tocontrol for possible e¤ects of in‡ation uncertainty
on output that take place via changes in in‡ation 8. The reported results indicate that
in‡ation uncertainty still a¤ects output negatively, even though the e¤ect is perhaps
somewhat weaker (i.e., it applies for two and four lags only).
3.3.3 PREDICTABILITY OF HIGHER LEVELS OF UK INFLATION
Several researchers, such as Engle (1983) and Cosimano and Jansen (1988), have failed to
…nd strongevidence that higherrates of in‡ation are less predictable. Using the EGARCH
model, we compare our results with theirs. The in‡ation and in‡ation uncertainty series
for the AR(6)-EGARCH(1,1) model are shown in Figure 2, which plots the in‡ation rate
and its corresponding conditional standard deviation in dual scale.
In contrast to the conclusion of the above-mentioned studies, Figure 2 provides evi-
dence that higher levels of in‡ation are less predictable. According to our estimates, the
conditional standard deviation average (annual rate) in the low-in‡ation 1960s is about
2.4%. In the high-in‡ation 1970s, the conditional standard deviation average (annual
rate) is about 4.3%. Finally, in the low-in‡ation environment of the 1990s, the average
of the conditional standard deviation is only 2.4%. Brunner and Hess (1993) argue that
it is the relaxation of the symmetry restriction in conditional volatility models which en-
ables them to …nd that higher levels of in‡ation are less predictable. We reach the same
conclusion by using an EGARCH model. To compare our results to theirs we also use an
asymmetric GARCH process. The AICandSCwere -6.979647and -6.759845 respectively,
muchworse than those of the EGARCHmodel. The estimates of the conditional standard
deviation were quite unsatisfactory as well. Figure 3 shows that the volatility of in‡ation
for the GARCH model is unreasonably high during the relatively low and stable in‡ation
years of the late 1980s and 1990s.
3.4 EVIDENCE FOR THE EURO-ZONE COUNTRIES
3.4.1 DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA AND ESTIMATION RESULTS
We apply the above empirical approach to …ve European countries (France, Germany,
Italy, theNetherlands, andSpain) that arepresently membersofthe Eurozone. Our group
of countries includes the largest four EMU countries. We use quarterly non-seasonally
adjusted time series on CPI obtained from the OECD main economic indicators database
from 1960:Q1 to 1999:Q39. To adjust the time series for seasonality, we use 3 seasonal
dummy variables in each country, provided they are jointly signi…cant10.
7This result is identical if we use GDP to measure real output.
8We are grateful to an anonymous referee for this point.
9The time series for France ends in 1999:Q2, for Germany in 1999:Q2, for Italy in 1999:Q3, for the
Netherlands in 1999:Q2, and for Spain in 1999:Q2.
10The seasonal dummy variables are jointly signi…cant in all the examined countries except for the
Netherlands and Spain.
7Table 3 presents ADF and PP tests of the unit root hypothesis for each country. The
PP tests reject the null hypothesis of a unit root for all six countries at 0.01 (0.05 for
France) signi…cance level. The ADF tests for France, Germany, and Italy fail to reject
the null hypothesis of a unit root, but we will consider their in‡ation series stationary in
our analysis, taking into consideration the Phillips-Perron results.
The best …tted model is chosen according to the minimum values of the AIC and
SC. We choose an EGARCH(1,1) speci…cation for the conditional variance and an AR(3)
model for France, an AR(7) for Germany, an AR(4) for Italy, and an AR(8) for the
Netherlands and Spain. Table 4 shows the estimated results for each country for the
models speci…ed above. In all countries, except Germany, the estimated coe¢cient d is
statistically signi…cant and positive, indicating evidence of asymmetry in the conditional
variance. This implies that negative and positive shocks to the in‡ation process have a
di¤erent impact on in‡ation uncertainty. More speci…cally, positive (negative) in‡ation
surprises lead to more (less) in‡ation uncertainty. For Germany, the estimated coef-
…cient of asymmetry is negative, implying that a positive in‡ation shock leads to less
uncertainty about in‡ation. This …nding can be attributed to the strong commitment
of the German monetary authority towards anti-in‡ationary policies. We also perform
the same speci…cation tests for the adequacy of the models as we did for the UK above.
For all the estimated models, residuals diagnostics (not reported) yield no evidence of
mis-speci…cation.
3.4.2 GRANGER-CAUSALITY TESTS
Table 5 reports the Granger-causality test results for the above …ve countries. The null
hypothesis that in‡ation does not Granger-cause in‡ation uncertainty is rejected for all
the examined countries at the 0.05 level and for each lag length, except Germany. These
results are similar to those of the UK, supporting the Friedman hypothesis. The null
hypothesis that in‡ation uncertainty does not Granger-cause in‡ation is rejected in all
countries. However, only in the case of Italy, France (2 lags) and Spain (6 and 8 lags) is
the e¤ect positive, supporting the Cukierman - Meltzer hypothesis. For Germany and the
Netherlands, where the e¤ect is negative, we …nd evidence in favour of Holland’s (1995)
stabilisation hypothesis discussed below.
Finally, the fourth column of Table 5 indicates that in‡ation uncertainty does not
Granger cause output growth in all countries, except perhaps Italy, where we …nd a
signi…cant andnegativeimpactonreal output growthat the 10% level and the Netherlands
and Spain, where the e¤ect is positive. Somewhat similar results apply in the last column
of Table 5, which adds the in‡ationrate inthe right-hand side of the regression. The only
di¤erences are the insigni…cance of in‡ation uncertainty in Italy and the slight evidence
for a positive impact in France. These results are discussed further below11.
11The choice of the industrial production index in measuring realoutput is dictated by the unavailability
of quarterly national acccounts (and hence GDP) for the full sample period for several countries in our
sample.
83.4.3 PREDICTABILITY OF INFLATION
As in the case of UK in‡ation, there is evidence that higher rates of in‡ation are less
predictable for each of the other European countries. This conclusion is derived from an
examination of the plots (not reported) of the in‡ation rate and its corresponding condi-
tional standard deviation for each country. This result is inagreement with the conclusion
of Brunner and Hess (1993) for the US. According to our estimated model for France, the
average of the conditional standard deviation (annual rate) in the high-in‡ation 1970s is
2% and in the low-in‡ation environment of the 1990s only 0.9%. Similarly, according to
our estimated model for Spain, the average value of the conditional standard deviation
(annual rate) in the 1970s is 4% whereas in the stable in‡ationary environment of the
1990s the average …gure is 1.6%. Similar results apply for the rest of the countries in our
sample.
3.5 ROBUSTNESS
Our sample period 1960-99 includes various exchange rate and monetary policy regimes.
For example, the UK operated under a managed ‡oat regime, following the collapse of
the Bretton Woods system, for most of our sample, except for the brief period of ERM
participation. Inaddition, from 1979to 1990, Thatcher’sgovernment emphasisedastrong
anti-in‡ation objective. Hence, we repeat the above analysis for the UK for two periods:
1973-99 (the managed ‡oat regime) and 1979-90 (the Thatcher years). The results are
presented in Table 6. Overall, these results are in broad agreement with those reported
in Table 2. It is interesting to note that during the Thatcher years in‡ation uncertainty
had no impact on output growth, a result that is very robust to the presence or absence
of lagged in‡ation in the regression equation. Moreover, there is some evidence, in both
periods under consideration, that in‡ation uncertainty lowers in‡ation, in agreement with
the stabilisation hypothesis.
For the rest of our sample, countries that were ERM members for most of our original
sample period 1960-99, we repeat the above analysis for the period 1983-9912. The choice
of this period is based on the widely accepted notion that the ERM entered a calmer
phase in 1983 following the turbulent early years (Gros and Thygesen, 1992). Following
the estimation of GARCH models for each country (results not reported), we perform
Granger-causality tests as previously and report the results in Table 7. These results
support those reported for the full sample period (see Table 5) in many respects. First,
we …nd strong support for the Friedman hypothesis regarding the positive impact of
in‡ation on in‡ation uncertainty in most countries (see column 2). Second, as was the
case in the analysis of the full period, we …nd that in‡ation uncertainty does not seem
to lead to lower output, with a single exception (last two columns of Table 7). Finally,
signi…cant di¤erence obtains between the full sample and the post-1983 period on the
signi…cance of the causal e¤ect of in‡ation uncertainty on in‡ation. We …nd (column
3) that in most countries, there is no causal e¤ect. This result squares with the loss of
12For all 6 countries, we have re-estimated the GARCH model using the new sample periods and
obtained new values for the conditional variances. These values have then been used in performing the
Granger-causality tests.
9monetary policy independence in the ERM period, as monetary policy was constrained
by the exchange-rate peg objective.
4 DISCUSSION
Our full sample period includes considerable in‡ation diversity both across countries and
across time. The high-in‡ation 1970s was followed by the low-in‡ation 1980s and 1990s.
This was the case for two reasons: First, the global reduction in in‡ationary pressures.
Second, some European countries, France, Italy, and Spain in our sample, joined the
European Monetary System (EMS) in 1979 in order to borrow Germany’s anti-in‡ation
reputation. This is less so for the Netherlands, which has traditionally aligned its mone-
tary policy stance to Germany’s. The reduction in in‡ation for France, Italy, and Spain
was more prevalent during the last stage of the EMS, starting in 1987. During most
of the 1990s, in‡ation remained low and relatively stable. The signi…cant variability in
the level of in‡ation and the uncertainty about it during our sample period provides the
testing ground to examine the bidirectional relationship between in‡ation and in‡ation
uncertainty.
We discuss …rst the Granger-causality results on the e¤ect of in‡ation on in‡ation
uncertainty. Our results indicate strong evidence in support of the Friedman hypothesis
for all countries, except Germany13. The lack of evidencefor Germany is not surprising, as
it is consistent with Ball’s (1992) theory, which formalised Friedman’s prediction14. Using
Ball’s (1992) argument, an increase in German in‡ation would not lead to more in‡ation
uncertainty as the Bundesbank had a strong anti-in‡ation reputation, and, therefore, was
willing to bear the costs of disin‡ation. Our result onthe Friedman hypothesis for France,
Italy, andthe UK is consistent withthe Grier and Perry (1998) study ofthe G7. However,
in contrast to our study, Grier and Perry (1998), using a di¤erent methodology (GARCH
model), sample size (1948-93), and data frequency (monthly, as opposed to quarterly)
…nd support for Friedman’s hypothesis for Germany. Our …nding of a non causal e¤ect of
in‡ation on in‡ation uncertainty for this country indicates that in‡ation uncertainty in
Germany is not caused by rising in‡ation rates.
Regarding the causality from in‡ation uncertainty to output growth, our Granger-
causality tests indicate that only in the UK does in‡ation uncertainty have a negative
e¤ect on output growth (when the full period is used). In the EMU countries during
the more relevant 1983-1999 period such an e¤ect does not apply. This is according to
the last column of Table 7 which allows us to separate the e¤ects of in‡ation uncertainty
on output. Hence, we conclude that the welfare costs of in‡ation do not seem to be
signi…cant, with the exceptionof the UK15. This …nding has importantimplications for the
ECB’s policymaking strategy. In particular, it supports those claiming that the objective
13No evidence in favour of the Friedman hypothesis applies for the Netherlands and Spain when the
1983-99 period is used.
14Ball (1992) uses an asymmetric information game where two policymakers with di¤erent preferences
towards in‡ation alternate stochastically in o¢ce. Therefore, a higher current in‡ation rate raises in‡ation
uncertainty as it is not known which policymaker will be in o¢ce in the next period.
15For the UK, the welfare cost of in‡ation was contained by the adoption of in‡ation targeting in 1992,
following the country’s brief participation in the EMS.
10of price stability has been overemphasised by the ECB. The second implication of these
output growth Granger-causality results concerns the application of a common monetary
policy by the ECB following the launch of the Euro zone in 1999. As we saw earlier,
in‡ation uncertainty does not seem to cause negative real e¤ects across all countries in
our sample, except in the UK. Hence, a common European monetary policy would have
relatively symmetrical real e¤ects (=zero), which work through the in‡ation uncertainty
channel, across the EMU countries16.
Our evidence on the Cukierman-Meltzer hypothesis is rather mixed. For Germany
and the Netherlands, we …nd evidence against this hypothesis. This evidence partially
favours the “stabilization hypothesis” put forward by Holland (1995). He claims that for
countries where in‡ation leads to in‡ation uncertainty and real costs, we would expect
the Central Bank to stabilize in‡ation, hence a negative e¤ect of in‡ation uncertainty
on in‡ation. Our evidence is in part17 consistent with this argument for Germany and
the Netherlands. In contrast, for Italy, France (2 lags) and Spain (not robust across the
various lags considered) we …nd evidence in favour of the Cukierman-Meltzer hypothesis.
Hence, these countries would be expected to gain signi…cantly from EMUas the surrender
of their monetary policy to the ECB would eliminate the policymakers’ incentive to create
in‡ation surprises. Finally, our evidence for the UK is rather mixed. At 2 and 6 lags, we
…nd evidence supporting the Cukierman-Meltzer hypothesis and at 4 and 8 lags evidence
against the hypothesis. Our evidence for France (lag 2) andthe UK (2 and 6 lags) squares
with the …ndings of Grier and Perry (1998) and Baillie et al (1996), respectively.
More independent Central Banks would have stronger anti-in‡ation preferences than
the government andhencelead to alower optimal in‡ation rate (Rogo¤, 1985). Moreover,
if in‡ation uncertainty is costly, i.e., it implies real output e¤ects, and in‡ation can a¤ect
in‡ation uncertainty (the Friedman hypothesis), an independent Central Bank will have
a greater incentive (and freedom) to reduce in‡ation in response to more uncertainty.
This is because in doing so (and hence keeping in‡ation uncertainty lower), the Central
Bank can attain both lower in‡ation and higher output, i.e., a higher welfare level. The
predictions of this analysis are borne out by the empirical evidence. AlesinaandSummers
(1993) show that more independent Central Banks are indeed associated with both lower
in‡ation and in‡ation uncertainty.
Our results for the impact of in‡ation uncertainty on in‡ation are generally consistent
withtheexisting literature on therankings of Central Bank Independence(see Alesina and
Summers, 1993). Countries like France, Italy and Spain have less independent Central
Banks than Germany and the Netherlands, at least using the measures of Central Bank
Independence that refer to the pre-1990 period, which is more in line with our sample
period. Hence, we would expect that lessindependentCentral Bankswouldbemore likely
to cause in‡ation surprises in response to higher in‡ation uncertainty, a result consistent
16For the Netherlands, Spain, and possibly France, we …nd evidence that in‡ation uncertainty raises
output growth, in particular when the full sample period 1960-99 is used. This, seemingly, surprising
result may arise under the assumption of risk averse agents and a precautionary motive for savings, as
Dotsey and Sarte (2000) have shown in their theoretical model. According to their argument, when
in‡ation uncertainty rises, savings increase and this boosts investment and growth.
17Our partial support arises from a lack of evidence for a negative impact of in‡ation uncertainty on
output growth for these two countries and a lack of evidence for the Friedman hypothesis for Germany.
11with the Cukierman-Meltzer hypothesis. Our empirical analysis generally supports this
prediction. Our conclusion on France and Germany also agrees with Grier and Perry
(1998).
5 CONCLUSIONS
The relationship between in‡ation and in‡ation uncertainty has been investigated in six
European Union countries for the period 1960 to 1999. EGARCH models were used to
generate a measure of in‡ation uncertainty and then Granger methods were employed to
test for causality between average in‡ation and in‡ation uncertainty. In all the European
countries of our sample, exceptGermany, in‡ationsigni…cantlyraisesin‡ationuncertainty,
as predicted by Friedman. However, in all countries, except the UK, in‡ation uncertainty
does not cause negative output e¤ects, implying that a common European monetary
policy applied by the ECB might not lead to asymmetric real e¤ects via the in‡ation
uncertainty channel.
Less robust evidence is found regarding the direction of the impact of a change in
in‡ation uncertainty on in‡ation. In Germany and the Netherlands, increased in‡ation
uncertainty lowers in‡ation, while in Italy, Spain, and to a lesser extent France, increased
in‡ation uncertainty raises in‡ation. These results are generally consistent with the
existing rankings of Central Bank Independence.
The reported di¤erences in the results between this study and related studies, such as
Grier and Perry (1998), can be attributed to the di¤erent methodologies, sample periods,
and data frequency. These di¤erences highlight the need for further empirical work in
search of more robust evidence on the relationship between in‡ation, in‡ation uncertainty
and output growth. This work will provide an additional testing ground for the empirical
relevance of economic theories and at the same time will be rather informative for the
authorities in charge of monetary policymaking.
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13APPENDIX A
This appendix reports the estimation results of an Exponential GARCH-in-mean
model of in‡ation in six countries with lagged in‡ation included in the conditional vari-
ance. As inthe text, the estimation periodis 1960-1999and the data frequency quarterly.
We simultaneously estimate a system of equations that allows only the current value of
either the conditional variance or standard deviation of in‡ation18 to a¤ect average in‡a-
tion and also allows up to the twelfth lag of average in‡ation to in‡uence the conditional
variance. The model includes the in‡ation equation which adds the in‡ation variance to
the equation reported in the text
…t = e …t¡1 +–ht + "t;
with
"t = eth
1
2
t ;
and the conditional variance equation:
(1 ¡ ﬂL)ln(ht) = ! +cjet¡1j +det¡1 + ki…t¡i
Inthe mean equation, e …t¡1 stands for the part of the regression that includes the intercept
and lagged in‡ation rates. In the variance equation, various lags of in‡ation (from 1 to
12) were considered with the best model chosen on the basis of the minimum value of the
Akaike information criterion.
The Table below reports only the estimated parameters of interest:
EGARCH
Level
EGARCH
In-Mean
EGARCH
Level
In -M ean
ki – ki –
UK k4 = 23:67
(0:03)
17:28
(0:32)
k4 = 25:20
(0:03)
7:92
(0:72)
FRANCE k6 = 6:26
(0:00)
177:18
(0:00)
k4 = 15:82
(0:05)
80:39
(0:00)
GERMANY k4 = 18:63
(0:16)
¡46:85
(0:74)
k2 = 8:05
(0:36)
¡46:21
(0:65)
ITALY k4 = 8:42
(0:06)
¡15:28
(0:40)
k6 = 3:40
(0:08)
¡12:94
(0:44)
NETH/NDS k6 = 3:21
(0:76)
2:50
(0:79)
k12 = 0:37
(0:97)
¡3:20
(0:81)
SPAIN k6 = 20:74
(0:04)
13:87
(0:60)
k6 = 20:92
(0:03)
¡3:99
(0:60)
Notes: (1) Probability values are given in parentheses.
(2) ki indicates the estimated coe¢cient that corresponds to the ith lag in the in‡ation rate.
Note that when we estimate the model for the UK without the in-mean e¤ect (– = 0),
thecoe¢cient for the e¤ect of the 4thlag ofin‡ationis 23.67 and is statistically signi…cant.
18According to the information criteria, the models with the variance of in‡ation were preferred to
those with the standard deviation.
14When we estimate the model without the level e¤ect (ki = 0), the in-mean coe¢cient
is insigni…cant (the probability value is 0.32). When we estimate the model with the
simultaneous feedback between the conditional variance and the conditional mean (last
two columns in the Table), the above results imply a positive association between lagged
in‡ation and uncertainty similar to that found using the two-step method in the text.
We do not …nd a signi…cant e¤ect of uncertainty on average in‡ation. However, as we
emphasize in the text, such a result is plausible, as any relationship where uncertainty
in‡uences average in‡ation takes time to materialize and cannot be fairly tested in a
model that restricts the e¤ect to being contemporaneous.
A comparison of the results of the simultaneous estimation(last two columns in Table)
withtheGrangercausalityresultsreportedinthetext for therest ofthecountries indicates
that, in general, there is consistency between the two approaches. In particular, as far
as the Friedman hypothesis (signi…cance of ki) is concerned, we …nd the two approaches
to be in agreement, except in the case of the Netherlands. However, a comparison of the
signi…cance of the causal e¤ect of in‡ation uncertainty on the in‡ation rate is not valid
due to the contemporaneous nature of the e¤ect under the simultaneous approach. As
expected, the simultaneous approach does not detect such an e¤ect in the majority of
countries considered.
15Table 1:
(a) In‡ation unit root tests
Country ADF t-statistic Phillips-Perron t-statistic
UK -2.620*** -8.040***
Notes: (1) In the ADF tests, we use two lagged di¤erenced terms. In the Phillips-Perron
tests, the truncation lag is set at four.
(2) *** indicates rejection of the unit root null at the 0.01 level.
(b) The estimated AR(6)-EGARCH(1,1) Model for the UK in‡ation rate
…t = 0.003
(0.00)
+ 0.566
(0.00)
…t¡1+ 0.178
(0.00)
…t¡4¡ 0.169
(0.01)
…t¡5 + 0.188
(0.00)
…t¡6+
+ 0.009
(0.00)
d2t ¡ 0.007
(0.00)
d3t + "t
ln(ht)= -3.196
(0.01)
+ 0.697
(0.00)
ln(ht¡1) + 0.242
(0.18)
jet¡1j +0.437
(0.02)
et¡1
Q(12)= 8.789[0.721], Q(24)= 24.810[0.416], Q(36)= 38.650[0.351]
Q2(12)= 12.957[0.372], Q2(24)= 22.579[0.545], Q2(36)= 26.794[0.867]
Notes: (1) The …rst equation representstheestimatedconditional mean of the autoregressive
model. d2t and d3t are seasonal dummies. The …gures in parentheses under the coe¢cients and
inside the square brackets show the probability values.
Table 2: Granger-Causality tests: UK (1960-1999)
H0: …t ! h…t H0: h…t ! …t H0: h…t ! yt Ha
0: h…t ! yt
Two Lags 4.741¤¤¤(+) 3.070¤¤¤(+) 8.775¤¤(-) 6.770¤¤¤(-)
Four Lags 4.721¤¤¤(+) 8.343¤¤(-) 6.410¤¤¤(-) 3.589¤¤¤(-)
Six Lags 9.202¤¤¤(+) 6.864¤(+) 5.410¤¤¤(-) 1.610
Eight Lags 5.294¤¤¤(+) 5.568¤(-) 3.345¤(-) 0.966
Notes: (1) The …gures are F statistics. (2) …t ! h…t: In‡ation does not Granger-cause
in‡ation uncertainty; h…t ! …t: In‡ation uncertainty does not Granger-cause in‡ation; h…t !
yt: In‡ation uncertainty does not Granger-cause output growth. (3) superscript (a) means that
lagged in‡ation has been addedto theregression. (4) thepositiveornegativesign inparentheses
indicates the sign of the sum of the lagged coe¢cients in the respective equation. (5) ***, **
and * indicate rejection of the null hypothesis at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels of signi…cance,
respectively.
16Table 3: In‡ation unit root tests
Country ADF t-statistic Phillips-Perron t-statistic
France -1.910 -3.110**
Germany -2.150 -5.420***
Italy -2.340 -3.880***
Netherlands -4.840*** -11.150***
Spain -2.720* -6.550***
Notes: (1) In the ADF tests we use two lagged di¤erenced terms. In the Phillips-Perron
tests the truncation lag is set at four, (2) ***, ** and * indicate rejection of the unit root null
at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels of signi…cance, respectively.
Table 4: The Estimated AR(p)-EGARCH(1,1) Models
Country
Parameter France Germany Italy Neth/nds Spain
…t¡1 0.645[0.000] 0.351[0.000] 0.754[0.000] 0.471[0.000] 0.182[0.006]
…t¡2 -0.016[0.837] 0.114[0.240] 0.247[0.001]
…t¡3 0.296[0.000] 0.279[0.000] 0.063[0.408] 0.191[0.022]
…t¡4 0.361[0.000] 0.039[0.420] 0.337[0.000] 0.232[0.000]
…t¡5 -0.195[0.000]
…t¡6 0.115[0.010]
…t¡7 -0.205[0.003] -0.193[0.003]
…t¡8 0.218[0.000] 0.253[0.000]
d 0.223[0.000] -0.032[0.736] 0.422[0.000] 0.347[0.050] 0.126[0.001]
c -0.215[0.013] 0.319[0.070] -0.194[0.000] 0.912[0.000] -0.163[0.048]
ﬂ 0.942[0.000] 0.680[0.011] 0.942[0.000] 0.745[0.000] 0.969[0.000]
Notes: (1) The estimated conditional variance equation has the form:
ln(ht)=!+ ﬂln(ht¡1) + c jet¡1j +d et¡1
(2) A constant term and seasonal dummies were included but not reported.
(3) Probability values are given in square brackets.
17Table 5: Granger causality tests for in‡ation and in‡ation uncertainty (1960-1999)
H0: …t ! h…t H0: h…t ! …t H0: h…t ! yt Ha
0: h…t ! yt
(A) France
Two Lags 46.381¤¤¤(+) 6.319¤¤¤(+) 0.274 1.425
Four Lags 28.570¤¤¤(+) 0.002 0.443 0.657
Six Lags 22.838¤¤¤(+) 0.240 1.128 1.902¤(+)
Eight Lags 17.676¤¤¤(+) 0.918 1.003 1.110
(B) Germany
Two Lags 1.200 0.946 0.850 0.728
Four Lags 0.669 2.780¤¤(-) 0.517 0.528
Six Lags 0.350 3.235¤¤¤(-) 1.151 0.535
Eight Lags 0.407 3.520¤¤¤(-) 0.803 0.409
(C) Italy
Two Lags 42.552¤¤¤(+) 0.039 2.540¤(-) 0.023
Four Lags 39.568¤¤¤(+) 4.559¤¤¤(+) 1.277 0.389
Six Lags 34.108¤¤¤(+) 6.458¤¤¤(+) 0.856 0.853
Eight Lags 38.773¤¤¤(+) 4.334¤¤¤(+) 1.754¤(-) 1.016
(D) The Neth/nds
Two Lags 20.394¤¤¤(+) 5.188¤¤¤(-) 8.106¤¤¤(+) 5.978¤¤¤(+)
Four Lags 9.382¤¤¤(+) 5.256¤¤¤(-) 6.889¤¤¤(+) 3.318¤(+)
Six Lags 10.114¤¤¤(+) 3.526¤¤¤(-) 3.734¤¤¤(+) 1.806¤(+)
Eight Lags 8.280¤¤¤(+) 2.820¤¤¤(-) 7.823¤¤¤(+) 0.606
(E) Spain
Two Lags 10.021¤¤¤(+) 1.081 3.254¤¤(+) 6.643¤¤¤(+)
Four Lags 8.221¤¤¤(+) 0.454 1.766 3.256¤¤¤(+)
Six Lags 7.142¤¤¤(+) 2.227¤¤(+) 2.113¤¤(+) 4.026¤¤¤(+)
Eight Lags 4.952¤¤¤(+) 2.212¤¤(+) 1.346 3.677¤¤¤(+)
Notes: (1) The …gures are F statistics.
(2) …t ! h…t: In‡ation does not Granger-cause in‡ation uncertainty; h…t ! …t: In‡ation
uncertainty doesnot Granger-causein‡ation; h…t ! yt: In‡ation uncertainty doesnot Granger-
cause output growth.
(3) superscript (a) means that lagged in‡ation has been added to the regression.
(4) the positive or negative sign in parentheses indicates the sign of the sum of the lagged
coe¢cients in the respective equations.
(5) ***, ** and * indicaterejection ofthenull at the0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels of signi…cance,
respectively.
18Table 6: Granger-Causality tests: UK
H0: …t ! h…t H0: h…t ! …t H0: h…t ! yt Ha
0: h…t ! yt
1979-90
Two Lags 0.350 14.867¤¤¤(-) 0.873 0.360
Four Lags 3.150¤¤¤(+) 6.233¤¤(-) 1.375 0.554
Six Lags 2.585¤¤(+) 2.785¤¤(-) 1.030 0.428
Eight Lags 3.495¤¤(-) 2.615¤¤(-) 0.909 0.560
1973-99
Two Lags 38.047¤¤¤(+) 0.722 2.514¤(-) 1.061
Four Lags 38.830¤¤¤(+) 2.286¤(-) 2.518¤¤(-) 0.815
Six Lags 55.507¤¤¤(+) 1.050 5.604¤¤¤(-) 0.896
Eight Lags 39.675¤¤¤(+) 1.118 3.700¤¤¤(-) 1.113
Notes: (1) The …gures are F statistics.
(2) …t ! h…t: In‡ation does not Granger-cause in‡ation uncertainty; h…t ! …t: In‡ation
uncertainty doesnot Granger-causein‡ation; h…t ! yt: In‡ation uncertainty doesnot Granger-
cause output growth.
(3) superscript (a) means that lagged in‡ation has been added to the regression.
(4) the positive or negative sign in parentheses indicates the sign of the sum of the lagged
coe¢cients in the respective equations.
(5) ***, ** and * indicaterejection ofthenull at the0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels of signi…cance,
respectively.
19Table 7: Granger causality tests for in‡ation and in‡ation uncertainty (1983-1999)
H0: …t ! h…t H0: h…t ! …t H0: h…t ! yt Ha
0: h…t ! yt
(A) France
Two Lags 4.724¤¤(+) 0.001 2.015 2.373¤(+)
Four Lags 3.432¤¤(+) 0.169 1.905 1.766
Six Lags 3.031¤¤(+) 0.237 0.552 1.018
Eight Lags 3.111¤¤¤(+) 0.396 0.604 1.269
(B) Germany
Two Lags 2.762¤(+) 0.651 1.566 1.410
Four Lags 4.026¤¤¤(+) 0.943 1.670 1.689
Six Lags 2.927¤¤(+) 0.845 2.479¤¤(-) 1.643
Eight Lags 2.293¤¤(+) 0.691 1.937¤(-) 1.374
(C) Italy
Two Lags 5.898¤¤¤(+) 3.605¤¤(-) 1.127 2.079
Four Lags 5.576¤¤¤(+) 2.038¤(-) 0.780 1.535
Six Lags 3.015¤¤(+) 2.933¤¤(-) 1.018 1.778
Eight Lags 1.947¤(+) 2.608¤¤(-) 1.033 0.844
(D) The Neth/nds
Two Lags 3.829¤¤(-) 4.492¤¤(-) 0.546 0.299
Four Lags 8.285¤¤¤(-) 1.442 2.068¤(+) 0.124
Six Lags 14.995¤¤¤(-) 0.971 1.585 0.297
Eight Lags 9.717¤¤¤(-) 1.069 0.539 0.686
(E) Spain
Two Lags 0.890 1.629 0.081 0.074
Four Lags 1.567 1.659 2.594¤¤(+) 2.923¤¤(+)
Six Lags 0.754 1.483 2.004¤(+) 1.549
Eight Lags 0.561 1.772 1.626 1.245
Notes: (1) The …gures are F statistics.
(2) …t ! h…t: In‡ation does not Granger-cause in‡ation uncertainty; h…t ! …t: In‡ation
uncertainty doesnot Granger-causein‡ation; h…t ! yt: In‡ation uncertainty doesnot Granger-
cause output growth.
(3) superscript (a) means that lagged in‡ation has been added to the regression.
(4) the positive or negative sign in parentheses indicates the sign of the sum of the lagged
coe¢cients in the respective equations.
(5) ***, ** and * indicaterejection ofthenull at the0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels of signi…cance,
respectively.
20Figure 1: UK inflation rate 
1960:Q1-1999:Q2
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Figure 2: UK inflation rate and 
conditional standard deviation, 
AR(6)-EGARCH(1,1) model. 
Estimation period 1960:Q1-1999:Q2
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21Figure 3: Inflation rate and 
conditional standard deviation, 
AR(6)-Asymmetric GARCH(1,1) model. 
Estimation period 1960:Q1-1999:Q2
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